Societal Threefolding and Good Governance, Part I

Nicanor Perlas
02 February 2009

Many eyes are now focused on the presidential and national elections of 2010. Many are eager to realize their dream of clean politics and a government that truly works for the benefit of the whole. But all the dreams of a political revolution will go down the drain if political reformers neglect to establish a new arrangement in addition to the current practice of achieving a balance of power by separating the functions of government into the executive, legislative, and judiciary. Some new politicians including Governor Ed Panlillo failed to establish a broader, more potent, and more comprehensive approach to balancing power. And they are now suffering the consequences.

Historical Attempt to Control the Totalitarian State

The current system of governance relies on a political invention introduced by the founders of the American Republic after their successful revolution of 1776. They sought to curb the power of any one branch of government and created a constitutional provision that would make the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government co-equal. In this way, one branch of government, the Office of the President, for example, cannot dictate upon another branch (either Congress or the Supreme Court) to do its bidding. A certain kind of political objectivity is maintained. This invention has since spread all over the world including the Philippines, whose political system is very similar to that of the US.

The American forefathers wanted to avoid the absolutist state models of Europe where the King was the State. As King, he was the law-maker, the executor, and the judge all rolled into one. There was no system of checks and balances. Hence monarchies were most often totalitarian and dictatorial.

King Louis XIV exemplified the perils and hubris of an absolutist state. He said: “The State is me”. He and his descendants believed this unity and executed this belief with total abandon. They increasingly alienated the people, thus setting the stage for the French revolution in 1787.

Decline of the Traditional Balance of Power

More than two centuries later, this invention, standing by itself, has outlived its usefulness. This political innovation has lost its original glamour and appeal. In the end, political systems do not run themselves. Human beings, with their beliefs, habits, skills, passions and imperfections run governments. And they invent all kinds of ways to circumvent the system of checks and balances.

The old scheme of governance did not predict the existence of tyrants like Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the illegal president of the Philippines. Arroyo hid her lust for absolute control under the veneer of due process and technicalities of the law. Meanwhile, behind the back of and at the expense of the people, she has relentlessly pursued an all-out policy of subverting the two other branches of government and placing them under her control. As we have seen (see previous TruthForce! editorials), Arroyo and her government are addicted to winning control over the legislative and judicial branches of government thru financial payoffs, favors, or thru plain harassment and intimidation. In the end, the so-called balance of power is a mere paper tiger.

New Politics versus Political Dynasties

Clearly a new concept of governance is needed to supplement the traditional balance of power. What this new innovation could be can be clearly seen in the dilemma faced by the bearers of the new politics once they assume office after winning elections. They have a great difficulty in governing. The system of checks and balances do not work. Instead the different branches of government have become the staging centers for attacking any initiative by a new non-traditional mayor or governor.

This is what typically happens when an alternative candidate wins and assumes office as mayor or as governor. The first thing he or she meets is a government system that has run very differently from how the political textbooks say they should. The balance of power so desired by political philosophers and reformers is but a figment of the imagination.

In reality, corruption is rampant. The patronage system is all over the place. There is a massive overlap between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government. The traditional balance of power does not work because they are made obsolete by the barkada system, so-called “old-boy networks”, drinking peers, and other totally unprofessional arrangements. That is the day-to-day reality.

Then the new politician has to contend with the political dynasty that he or she has just defeated. If trapos have been in power for 30 to 40 years, they are not going to just give up all those years of privilege and corrupt access to government money. They will try to regain power at all costs.

Among some of the ways the Empire strikes back is to create their own mass media and relentlessly attack the new incumbent. Then their money will start working behind the back of the new politician, undermining his or her moves at every turn. At the same time, all their lies, magnified through their own mass media, begin to erode the credibility of the reform-minded mayor or governor.

Just take a look at the case of Governor Ed Panlillo. Why are most of the mayors in Pampanga upset with him? Why are they now trying to oust him from power?

The answer is simple. Governor Panlillo has upset the balance of power, the one that works on the basis of “you scratch my back and I scratch yours”. This is the old Filipino value of pakikisama (smooth interpersonal relationship or S.I.R.) and utang na loob (debt of gratitude). You allow me, as governor, to rake in most of the quarrying fees and I will give you, mayors, some of the financial rewards of power.

Civil Society and the New Balance of Power

There is only one kind of power that a new politics governor or mayor can rely on. And that is the organized power of the autonomous civil society in his or her town, city or province. Only an independent civil society can step in and mediate in the political conflict.

What can traditional politicians (trapos) achieve if civil society is unified behind a new governor? Nothing. If trapos want a recall to gain back political control, they will not be successful. Because, in the end, the recall will be blunted by a well-organized civil society in the area. What if trapos do not pass a much-needed legislation? What will they achieve? Again, maybe something temporarily but nothing in the end. For in the long run, civil society will vote them out of office in the next elections or expose their shenanigans in the media.

This alliance outside the state with forces in civil society also works for the benefit of the political reformer in another way. Let us assume that there is no overt opposition to the new breed of politician. Let us assume that political comradeship prevails. This situation is much more difficult to handle than outright opposition.

Assume that the political reformer, whether an elected or appointed official, wants to pass or undertake a new initiative. But his political friends and allies do not want the initiative, not because the initiative is worthless but because the initiative does not converge with the narrower self-serving interests of the trapos.

In a situation like this, civil society can be of tremendous help to the efforts of a genuinely good government official. From the outside, they can advocate for the kind of policy reforms that the new breed of politician can then push from the inside. And the latter will be more effective because she can demonstrate to her colleagues that the new initiative that she wants to push is not her own personal agenda. It has the backing of the public.

The Importance of Partnership between the New Politics and Civil Society

This is not a hypothetical example. It happens all the time. In one specific instance, an Undersecretary of the Department of Education wanted to pass an education initiative. But, predictably, Arroyo had a different way of calculating benefits and costs. She uses political, not educational criteria.

In this specific instance, the Undersecretary of Education wanted classrooms to be of a certain optimal size to facilitate the learning of children in school. Arroyo wanted a bigger classroom so that more children can be packed into the classroom and the official government statistics for number of students in schools would look good.

In the end, whose view prevailed? Obviously, the view of Arroyo dominated. The Undersecretary could not point to an external source, in civil society, or in business, for widespread support for his initiative. These are the kinds of conflict between quality and expediency and political points that result in the Philippines ranking in the 4th to the bottom in terms of English and Math proficiency in the world.

In a counterexample, an Undersecretary of Agriculture managed to ban 32 deadly pesticide formulations despite the massive opposition of the pesticide industry and their puppets inside government. Why did he prevail? This high official reached out to civil society to help him rid his department of corrupt officials and dangerous pesticides. Civil society obliged and launched a massive research and media effort to ban the 32 pesticide formulations. Eventually their joint effort received the support of global civil society and UN agencies worried about the widespread poisoning of farmers by toxic pesticides.

The partnership of the reform-minded government official and civil society resulted in the historical banning of 32 pesticide formulations. Their partnership also triggered the unprecedented launching of a P750 million national program that taught farmers to reduce their use of pesticides and ultimately to stop their reliance on these toxic chemicals.

This promising development points to a new framework of governance that new politicians need to advocate to achieve profound societal transformation amidst opposition from the political dynasties they have toppled. We will explore the contours of this new approach to good governance in Part II of this article.